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AIDSPHOBIA AND THE 'WINDOW OF ANXIETY"3:**
ENLIGHTENED REASONING OR CONCESSION TO
IRRATIONAL FEAR?
[T]he average person has a profound negative bias toward AIDS....
"They'll be asked, 'Well, do you think you can really contract HIV
this way?' They'll say 'no,' but it brings to mind things they just
don't want to think about-homosexuality, death, drugs."... [A] key
factor in the bias is "sympathetic magic"-the belief, commonly
found in traditional cultures, that when two objects meet, the
characteristics of one can be transmitted to the other.'
INTRODUCTION
Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome ("AIDS") is a fatal
disease for which there is still no cure.2 Thirteen years after
the beginning of the AIDS epidemic, however, more is known
about the causative agent, human immunodeficiency virus
("HIV"), than about any other virus.' In addition, there are
methods proven to help prevent the transmission of HIV.4 Yet,
despite both the widespread availability of this information
and efforts on the part of educators to disseminate it, there re-
mains an "obdurate ignorance surrounding the subject" and
"many people remain confused about how the disease is trans-
mitted."5
Not surprisingly, in the United States there is a growing
* The term "AIDSphobia" refers to the fear of contracting HIV or developing
AIDS. See, e.g., Ordway v. County of Suffolk, 154 Misc. 2d 269, 271-72, 583
N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1015-16 (Sup. Ct. 1992); Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 153
Misc. 2d 1, 4, 588 N.Y.S.2d 695, 697 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
** Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 337 (Md. 1993).
1 David Gelman, A Resistance to Reason, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 29, 1993, at 79.
' See infra notes 22-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of HIV and
AIDS.
' Michael H. Merson, Slowing the Spread of HIV Agenda for the 1990s, 260
Sci. 1266 (1993).
For example, because AIDS is "essentially a sexually transmitted disease,"
using condoms during sex, having fewer sex partners and choosing non-penetrative
forms of sex can slow the spread of the AIDS epidemic. Id. at 1266-67.
' Gelman, supra note 1, at 79.
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body of litigation generated both by the fear of contracting HIV
or developing AIDS and by the fear of those who are, indeed,
infected with HIV or who have AIDS.6 Because HIV is spread
through sexual contact and the exchange of bodily fluids, cases
involving HIV/AIDS have arisen in a variety of contexts.
Claims have been based on the sexual transmission of HIV7
and the transmission of HIV from contaminated blood8 and
blood components.9 Still other actions have involved employ-
ment discrimination, ° the segregation of HIV-infected indi-
' See infra notes 22-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of the distinc-
tion between HIV and AIDS.
' See, e.g., Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (tort action
against sex partner for wrongful transmission of HIV); Virgin Islands v. Roberts,
756 F. Supp. 898 (D.V.I. 1991) (government sought order compelling defendant in
criminal rape trial to undergo HIV-antibody testing); People v. Dempsey, 610
N.E.2d 208 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (defendant convicted of criminal transmission of
HIV).
' See, e.g., Kirkendall v. Harbor Ins. Co., 698 F. Supp. 768 (W.D. Ark. 1988)
(action against blood bank after patient received transfusion of HIV-contaminated
blood), affd, 887 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1989); Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F.
Supp. 1048 (D.D.C. 1987) (action brought by the parents of a child who died as a
result of receiving HIV-contaminated blood transfusion), affd in relevant part, 851
F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Ctr. v. District Ct., 763
P.2d 1003 (Colo. 1988) (action brought by patient who had contracted HIV through
blood transfusion); Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Servs., 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla.
1987) (action seeking the identities of blood donors after plaintiff received HIV-con-
taminated blood transfusion); Krygier v. Airweld, Inc., 137 Misc. 2d 306, 520
N.Y.S.2d 475 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (same); Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Hughes, 734
S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (action seeking names and addresses of blood
donors after plaintiffs daughter had contracted HIV through a blood transfusion).
See, e.g., Seitzinger v. American Rod Cross, No. 90-0046, 1991 WL 88023
(E.D. Pa. May 21, 1991) (action against supplier after transfusion of HIV-contami-
nated clotting factor for hemophiliacs); Doe v. Travenol Lab., Inc., 698 F. Supp.
780 (D. Minn. 1988) (action against manufacturer of anti-hemophilic factor after
infection with HIV); Poole v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 698 F. Supp. 1367 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (hemophiliac patient claiming to have been infected with HIV after receiving
an anti-hemophilic factor brought an action against those in the factor's distribu-
tion chain).
Hemophiliacs are more susceptible to HIV infection because the blood clotting
protein (factor VIII) is chemically unstable and cannot be put through the usual
purification process without being destroyed. RONALD MUNSON, INTERVENTION AND
REFLECTION: BASIC ISSUES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 214 (4th ed. 1992). In addition, a
single injection of factor VIII may contain the protein from as many as 2500 peo-
ple. Id.
10 See, e.g., Doe v. Attorney Gen. of United States, 941 F.2d 780 (9th Cir.
1991) (physician with AIDS brought breach of contract action for FBI's refusal to
send agents and applicants for physical exams allegedly because he was HIV-in-
fected); Doe v. District of Columbia, 796 F. Supp. 559 (D.D.C. 1992) (HIV-positive
firefighter applicant brought an employment discrimination claim when offer of
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viduals," the confidentiality of an individual's HIV-positive
status, 2 and the denial of medical treatment to H1W-infected
individuals. 3
employment was withdrawn); Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1990)
(regional partner of law firm brought action against firm claiming he was dis-
charged because of his HIV-infected status); Plowman v. United States Dep't of
Army, 698 F. Supp. 627 (E.D. Va. 1988) (HIV-infected civilian employee's action
against former supervisor who allegedly forced him to resign because he was HIV-
positive); see also Doe v. Washington Univ., 780 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. Mo. 1991)
(action by dental student who was disenrolled by a university committee because
of his HIV-positive status).
Other employment based actions have concerned mandatory testing policies.
See, e.g., Anonymous Fireman v. City of Willoughby, 779 F. Supp. 402 (N.D. Ohio
1991) (challenging city's policy of mandatory HIV-status testing for firefighters and
paramedics as part of annual physical exam); Glover v. Eastern Neb. Community
Office, 686 F. Supp. 243 (D. Neb. 1988) (enjoining enforcement of an infectious dis-
ease policy requiring mandatory HIV testing of health services employees), affd,
867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932 (1989).
" See, e.g., Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1991) (action challeng-
ing the uniform segregation of prisoners testing positive for HIV); Chalk v. United
States Dist. Ct., 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988) (action brought by HIV-infected
teacher after being removed from the classroom and assigned administrative du-
ties); Doe v. Dolton Elementary Sch., 694 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (action
challenging school's refusal to allow HIV-infected student to attend); Thomas v.
Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (same); Ray v.
School Dist., 666 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (action seeking injunction against
plan to segregate three HIV-infected school children from the rest of the student
body); District 27 Community Sch. Bd. v. Board of Educ., 130 Misc. 2d 398, 502
N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (action by local school boards and community to
prohibit an HIV-infected student from attending public school).
12 See, e.g., Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs, 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990) (action
by HIV-positive employee after being terminated for failing to comply with
hospital's disclosure requirements); Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp.
376 (D.N.J. 1990) (action brought after a police officer publicly disclosed a citizen's
HIV-positive status to community residents); Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr.,
592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991) (action by HIV-infected physician
against hospital for failing to keep his diagnosis and test results confidential); In
re Milton S. Hershey Med. Ctr., 595 A.2d 1290 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (action by
HIV-positive physician to prevent hospital from disclosing his status to colleagues
and patients), affd, 634 A.2d 159 (Pa. 1993); Hillman v. Columbia County, 474
N.W.2d 913 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (action by inmate of county jail when information
regarding his HIV-positive status was publicized among jail employees and other
inmates); see also McBarnette v. Feldman, 153 Misc. 2d 627, 582 N.Y.S.2d 900
(Sup. Ct. 1992) (estate of deceased HIV-infected dentist asserting physician-patient
privilege and confidentiality of HIV and AIDS-related information to challenge a
state action seeking the dentist's patient records).
13 See, e.g., Miller v. Spicer, 822 F. Supp. 158 (D. Del. 1993) (patient was re-
fused medical treatment based upon his perceived sexual preference and HIV sta-
tus); Glanz v. Vernick, 756 F. Supp. 632 (D. Mass. 1991) (physician and clinic
refused to perform elective ear surgery because patient tested positive for HIV).
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Courts also have been presented with "AIDSphobia" claims
by plaintiffs seeking to recover damages for their fear of devel-
oping AIDS, allegedly suffered after a potential exposure to
HIV.'4 These AIDSphobia claims have been raised where the
plaintiff either has established that the object or person caus-
ing the fear was contaminated or infected with HIV, 5 or does
not know or is unable to determine if the alleged source of
infection was contaminated with HIV.16
14 See generally Harry H. Lipsig, AIDS Phobia and Negligent Infliction of Emo-
tional Distress, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 26, 1992, at 3.
Courts also have faced the question of whether to allow damages for emotion-
al distress where the plaintiff receives a false positive test result for HIV. See,
e.g., M.M.H. v. United States, 966 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1992) (suggesting that recov-
ery for emotional distress may be allowable where the plaintiff is not immediately
informed that a second blood test indicates that she is not infected with HIV);
Lubowitz v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 623 A.2d 3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (denying
recovery for emotional distress when plaintiffs fear of developing AIDS was based
on a false positive test result).
False positive results may occur because of "laboratory error, either labeling
errors or technical errors, previous illness, pregnancy, and because other
retroviruses have the same molecular weight as the AIDS virus and can mimic a
positive finding." Glover, 686 F. Supp. at 248 (discussing testing procedures for
HIV antibodies).
1 See Marriott v. Sedco Forex Int'l Resources, 827 F. Supp. 59 (D. Mass. 1993)
(plaintiffs sought recovery for emotional distress after learning that a hepatitis
inoculation they received was contaminated with HIV); Transamerica Ins. Co. v.
Doe, 840 P.2d 288 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (rescuers were exposed to blood while
assisting the victims of a car accident and suffered fear of developing AIDS after
learning that one of the victims was HIV-infected); Ordway v. County of Suffolk,
154 Misc. 2d 269, 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (surgeon brought action after
he learned that his patient was HIV-infected); Funeral Servs. by Gregory, Inc., v.
Bluefield Community Hosp., 413 S.E.2d 79 (W. Va. 1991) (mortician alleged fear of
developing AIDS after he unknowingly embalmed an HIV-infected corpse), over-
ruled by Courtney v. Courtney, 437 S.E.2d 436 (W. Va. 1993); Johnson v. West
Va. Univ. Hosps., 413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1991) (security guard suffered fear after
being bitten by a hospital AIDS patient where the patient bit himself and drew
blood before biting the guard).
1" See Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 810 F. Supp. 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (rail-
road worker was stuck by a hypodermic needle while he was cleaning refuse left
in area where drug addicts loitered), affd, No. 93-7521, 1994 WL 401512 (2d Cir.
July 29, 1994); Burk v. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (para-
medic stuck by needle sticking out of a disposal container for needles and other
disposable sharp objects); Hare v. State, 173 A.D.2d 523, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125 (2d
Dep't 1991) (plaintiff developed fear of developing AIDS after he was bitten by a
prison inmate), appeal denied, 78 N.Y.2d 859, 580 N.E.2d 1058, 575 N.Y.S.2d 455
(1991); Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 153 Misc. 2d 1, 588 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup.
Ct. 1991) (cleaning worker stuck by needle that was left in an office waste con-
tainer); Doe v. Doe, 136 Misc. 2d 1015, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (wife
alleged that her husband had had homosexual affairs that put her at risk of de-
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In trying to resolve these AIDSphobia claims, some courts
have sought guidance from "cancerphobia" claims, which in-
volve plaintiffs who were exposed to cancer-causing materi-
als." These courts reason that guidance can be gained from
cancerphobia cases because of the similarities between cancer
and AIDS. Both diseases are incurable and fatal. Also, just like
cancer, AIDS takes several years to develop after one is ex-
posed to the disease-causing agent."8
Recently, courts have tried a new approach in resolving
AIDSphobia claims. In AIDSphobia claims brought by patients
of HIV-infected surgeons, two state courts allowed the plain-
tiffs to recover damages. In both cases, the plaintiffs brought
their claims after learning that their surgeons were HIV-infect-
ed. They alleged fear that they contracted HIV and will devel-
op AIDS because their surgeon performed an invasive proce-
dure during which there was a potential that HIV could have
been transmitted. 9 Based on the theory that their HIV-infect-
ed surgeons had a duty to disclose their HIV status before
performing any invasive procedures, the patients brought
claims for, inter alia, negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress.0 The courts, however, limited recovery to a "reasonable
window of anxiety" period: from the time the patients learned
of their surgeon's HIV infection to the point at which they
learned with a reasonable medical certainty that they were not
exposed to HIV.2
In examining the compensability of ADSphobia, this Note
veloping AIDS).
" See, e.g., Burk, 747 F. Supp. at 287 (deciding compensability of an AIDS-
phobia claim and analogizing to cases involving the fear of developing cancer or
asbestosis from exposure to asbestos); West Va. Univ. Hosps., 413 S.E.2d at 893
("Another area that is relevant to our consideration of this [AIDSphobial case is
'cancerphobia,' arising from asbestos-related torts."); see also John P. Darby, Note,
Tort Liability for the Transmission of the AIDS Virus: Damages for Fear of AIDS
and Prospective AIDS, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 185 (1988) (arguing that courts
should apply the same analysis from case law involving carcinogen exposure to
claims involving HIV transmission).
" See infra text accompanying notes 29-31.
19 For a definition of invasive procedures, see infra note 45.
20 Kerins v. Hartley, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621 (Ct. App.) (plaintiff brought action
against her surgeon after learning that he was HIV-infected during the time he
operated on her), opinion superseded by 860 P.2d 1182 (Cal. 1993); Faya v.
Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993) (same); see also infra note 84.
21 See Kerins, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 632; Faya, 620 A.2d at 337.
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first outlines the current state of knowledge regarding HIV
and AIDS and briefly surveys how courts have treated cancer-
phobia and AIDSphobia claims, including a look at the "win-
dow of anxiety" cases. This Note argues that limited guidance
can be gained from an analysis of cancerphobia cases in at-
tempting to resolve AIDSphobia claims. The analogy between
cancerphobia and AIDSphobia claims may seem attractive
because of the similarities between carcinogens and HIV: both
cause deadly and incurable diseases that require a latency
period to develop fully. But with cancerphobia claims, the
question at issue is whether the plaintiff will develop cancer
after being exposed to a cancer-causing agent. The question of
whether the plaintiff was initially exposed to the cancer-caus-
ing agent is not at issue. With AIDSphobia claims, however,
the issue is whether the plaintiff, in fact, was exposed to HIV
in the first place.
This Note also argues that the fear of AIDS should not be
a legally compensable injury unless the plaintiff satisfies a
two-prong test to prove that there was exposure to HIV by
either: (1) testing positive for HIV antibodies; or (2) showing
that the alleged source of HIV is itself contaminated or infect-
ed with HIV and establishing an explicit channel through
which the exchange of bodily fluids could have taken place.
Allowing plaintiffs to recover damages for claims based purely
on the fear of developing AIDS, when the plaintiff cannot dem-
onstrate actual exposure to HIV and when there is no possi-
bility that the plaintiff will develop AIDS, is not sound public
policy and is likely to lead to a flood of speculative and frivo-
lous litigation.
Finally, this Note argues that the application of the "Win-
dow of anxiety" approach to limiting damages in AIDSphobia
claims should be confined to health care settings where the
plaintiffs are patients who were rendered unconscious during
an invasive procedure performed by their health care worker
("HCW"). Plaintiffs who were unconscious during invasive
procedures are at a disadvantage because they cannot know if
there was an accident during the procedure that may have led
to the transmission of HIV from their HIV-infected HCW.
Consequently, they would be unable to satisfy this Note's pro-
posed two-prong test. This limited application will prevent
many frivolous claims that would otherwise be rewarded if the
[Vol. 60: 461
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"window" were opened up to general AIDSphobia claims.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts about HIV and AIDS
1. The Disease, its Transmission, and Testing
In the spring of 1981, the Centers for Disease Control
("CDC")22 focused attention on New York and California
where physicians were reporting unusual cases of patients
with weakened immune systems and various opportunistic
infections.' This was the beginning of the AIDS epidemic.24
As of mid-1993 the World Health Organization ('"VHO") esti-
mated that over thirteen million adults world-wide have been
infected with HIV, the retrovirus that causes AIDS.' More
The CDC is an agency of the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services
that provides health information and conducts research to track down the sources
of epidemics. 3 WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 261 (World Book-Childcraft Int'I, Inc.
1981). In 1992, the CDC changed its name to the "Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention." See Prevention Added to CDC's Name, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 30, 1992,
at 3. The initials "CDC" were retained, however, because of their recognizability.
Id.
' MUNSON, supra note 9, at 214. Opportunistic infections take advantage of
the body's weakened immune system and are caused by organisms that usually do
not cause disease in healthy people. AMERICAN FOUND. FOR AIDS RESEARCH, 6
AIDS/HIV TREATMENT DIRECTORY 173 (1993). Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia
("PCP"), a parasitic infection affecting the lungs, is "the most common life-threat-
ening opportunistic infection in AIDS patients." Id. at 174. Other opportunistic
infections can include: candidiasis (fungal infection of mucous membranes lining
the mouth or respiratory tract); cytomegalovirus ("CMV") (a herpes virus most
frequently infecting the retina and colon of AIDS patients); Kaposi's sarcoma (a
rare cancer that is the most commonly diagnosed malignancy in HIV-infected peo-
ple); salmonellosis and sinusitis (bacterial infections); extra-pulmonary tuberculosis
(a mycobacterial infection); and wasting syndrome (profound involuntary weight
loss). Id. at 55-93. These various cancers and infections are what actually kills
people with AIDS.
2 When the CDC checked its records it found cases that were reported as
early as 1978 and 1979. Initially, all of the cases involved homosexual men. When
later reports of those infected began to include intravenous drug users and Haitian
immigrants, however, the cases ceased falling into any specific pattern. MUNSON,
supra note 9, at 213.
' Merson, supra note 3, at 1266. In addition, as of mid-1993, approximately
one million children world-wide have been infected with HIV at or around the
time of birth. Id. Retroviruses copy genetic material using the ribonucleic acid
("RNA") of a cell as a guide for making viral deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") to rep-
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than two million of those infected have developed AIDS, and
most of them have died.26 In North America, where the epi-
demic is the oldest, more than one million adults are infected
with HIT
27
HIV is found in blood, semen, vaginal secretions, and pos-
sibly breast milk,2" and is spread through vaginal, anal, or
oral sexual contact, subcutaneous exposure to infected blood or
blood components, sharing of hypodermic needles, and during
pregnancy or the birthing process. Once infected with HIV, the
immune system's response is to produce antibodies to ward off
the infectious invader. Current estimates are that
seroconversion, the production of antibodies, takes place within
6 to 12 weeks after infection.29
Once infected with HIV there may be no symptoms, or
only minor ones, for an average of 10 years."0 AIDS is the
licate itself. AMERICAN FOUND. FOR AIDS RESEARCH, supra note 23, at 171-74.
Although HIV is necessary to develop AIDS, "our lack of understanding has
led some commentators to query whether HIV infection is sufficient to cause AIDS
or whether HIV may be essentially harmless in the absence of other cofactors."
Robin A. Weiss, How Does HIV Cause AIDS?, 260 Sci. 1273, 1273 (1993) (citing
ROBERT S. ROOT-BERNSTEIN, RETHINKING AIDS: THE TRAGIC COST OF PREMATURE
CONSENSUS (1993)).
28 Merson, supra note 3, at 1266. Only three years earlier, in mid-1990, WHO's
world-wide estimates were that six million to eight million people were infected
with HIV and 700,000 had developed AIDS. Geoffrey Cowley et al., AIDS: The
Next Ten Years, NEWSWEEK, June 25, 1990, at 20. In 1990, WHO projected that
twenty million people world-wide would be infected with HIV and five million to
six million people would develop AIDS by the year 2000. Id. If current rates of
infection continue at their present pace, the AIDS epidemic will quickly surpass
these estimates.
2' Merson, supra note 3, at 1266. More than 8 million people in sub-Saharan
Africa, 1.5 million in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 1.5 million in south
and southeast Asia are infected with HIV. The majority of those HIV-positive
persons became infected through heterosexual intercourse. Id.
2 HIV has also been found in low concentrations in saliva, tears and urine.
However, only blood, semen vaginal fluids and possibly breast milk have been
implicated in HIV transmission. Centers for Disease Control, Recommendations for
Prevention of H1V Transmission in Health-Care Settings, 36 MMWR 2S, 3S (Supp.
Aug. 21, 1987) [hereinafter Prevention of HIV Transmission].
2 Id. at 13S. During this period there is a depletion of T-4 lymphocytes ("help-
er T-cells"), white blood cells that are crucial to making the antibodies effective.
There is also an increase in the number of T-8 lymphocytes ("suppressor T-cells")
that inhibit the antibody system. This severely cripples the body's immune system.
MUNSON, supra note 9, at 214. A current model of how HIV works is that the
virus enters a T-cell and becomes incorporated into its DNA. When another in-
fectious agent (e.g., a cold virus) activates the T-cell, the HIV reproduces itself,
kills the T-cell, and releases new HIV to infect other T-cells. Id. at 215.
20 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT
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end-stage of HIV infection and takes a varied but generally
long time to develop."' As a result of their weakened immune
systems, victims of AIDS are susceptible to opportunistic infec-
tions." These infections eventually cause death.
Blood tests can accurately determine whether an individu-
al has been infected with HIV by testing for HIV antibodies.3
TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC ON HIV INFECTION AND AIDS 1 (1993) [hereinafter SUR-
GEON GENERAL'S REPORT].
The distinction between HIV and AIDS is important because "most people do
not have any symptoms when they are first infected with HIV." Id. at 5. Conse-
quently, most people infected with HIV do not know they are infected because
they may look and feel healthy. People with AIDS, in contrast, often suffer from
"many types of infections, and those infections happen more often and get worse."
Id. Early detection of HIV can delay the onset of AIDS with the use of medication
and other treatment and lead to a longer life for people infected with HIV.
In current legal and popular literature regarding HIV and AIDS, there are
references to "the HIV virus," "contracting AIDS" or "transmitting AIDS," and
"blood tests for AIDS." These flawed phrases are some of the more common carry-
overs from early writings and continue to add to the confusion surrounding the
HIV/AIDS crisis. HIV is an acronym for human immunodeficiency virus. To add
the term "virus" after HIV is unnecessary. More appropriate would be the term
"AIDS virus" or simply "HIV." The phrases "contracting AIDS" and "transmitting
AIDS" are similarly defective. "AIDS" is the acronym for acquired immunodeficien-
cy syndrome. A syndrome is "a group of signs and symptoms that collectively
indicate or characterize a disease." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1233 (2d ed.
1991). Symptoms cannot be contracted nor transmitted. A virus like HIV, however,
can be contracted or transmitted.
Finally, "blood tests for AIDS" do not exist. Tests currently in use detect
antibodies to HIV or HIV itself. The presence of antibodies indicates infection with
HIV but does not mean that the infected person has AIDS. AIDS can be charac-
terized by a number of defining diagnoses of symptoms like PCP, cytomegalovirus
retinitus (eye infection) with loss of vision, or Kaposi's sarcoma (a rare cancer).
See supra note 23 for a discussion of opportunistic infections.
"1 Weiss, supra note 25, at 1273. "[Glenetic, behavioral, and environmental
factors [may] influence the rate of progression to AIDS among individuals." Id. at
1274.
2 See supra note 23 and accompanying text for a discussion of opportunistic
infections.
' Testing of the nation's blood supply began in mid-1985. Donors are pre-
screened for risk factors that may make them susceptible to HIV infection. People
at increased risk are not allowed to donate blood. In addition, blood samples are
put through seven different tests for exposure to HIV and other viruses. The blood
supply in the United States is now considered among the safest in the world.
Cases involving pre-1985 transfusions, however, continue to arise. See, e.g., Smith
v. Paslode Corp., 7 F.3d 116 (8th Cir. 1993) (transfusions during surgery of HIV-
contaminated blood); Barton v. American Red Cross, 829 F. Supp. 1290 (M.D. Ala.
1993) (HIV-contaminated blood transfusion); Estate of Doe v. Vanderbilt Univ. Inc.,
824 F. Supp. 746 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (HIV-contaminated blood transfusion from
1984); Doe v. United States, 805 F. Supp. 1513 (D. Haw. 1992) (army medical
center tranfusion in 1985 caused HIV infection); Doe v. American Nat'l Red Cross,
19941
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If the test results are negative for HIV antibodies there is a
relative certainty that there has been no exposure to HIV.
Since 1987, tests for HIV antibodies have been estimated to be
at least 99% accurate when performed on blood samples of
individuals infected for twelve weeks or more.34 A second neg-
ative test after 3 to 6 months confirms that there has been no
exposure, as long as the individual being tested has not en-
gaged in any behaviors that risk exposure to HIV in the inter-
im. Experts now estimate that the two tests together are more
than 99.9% accurate in detecting the presence of HIV antibod-
ies.35
2. CDC Recommendations for the Prevention of HIV
Transmission from HCW to Patient
Prior to 1990, people in health care settings feared that
HIV-infected patients posed the risk of transmitting HIV to the
HCWs who treated them, and that these HCWs would then
transmit the disease to other patients.36 These fears were
798 F. Supp. 301 (E.D.N.C. 1992) (BIV-contaminated blood transfusions during
1985 surgeries).
The enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay ("ELISA") and Western Blot tests are
most commonly used. The ELISA test is highly sensitive-it rarely fails to detect
the presence of HIV antibodies-but not specific (it shows many false positives).
Thus, after a positive reading the test is repeated. If it shows positive again the
Western Blot, a highly specific test, is used to confirm the results. MUNSON, supra
note 9, at 217.
" Prevention of HIV Transmission, supra note 28, at 13S.
3" CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, VOLUNTARY HIV COUNSEL-
ING AND TESTING: FACTS, ISSUES AND ANSWERS 18 (1993).
3 HCWs caring for HIV-infected patients are faced with the threat of a fatal
disease with any type of procedure performed. For example, in Estate of Behringer
v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991), Behringer was a
staff physician practicing as an ear-nose-throat specialist. After he was diagnosed
with AIDS, Behringer believed that he was infected with HIV when he failed to
wear a mask as he performed an emergency tracheotomy on an infected patient.
MUNSON, supra note 9, at 221. In Prego v. City of New York, 147 A.D.2d 165, 541
N.Y.S.2d 995 (2d Dep't 1989), a hospital extern tested positive for HIV infection
after two separate incidents of being stuck by needles used on AIDS patients.
During one occasion she was stuck by a needle left among refuse on a patient's
bed. The other needle stick occurred while she was drawing blood from an AIDS
patient.
In 1988, the American Medical Association ("AMA") addressed the concerns of
physicians over treating HIV-infected patients and stated that "[a] physician may
not ethically refuse to treat a patient whose condition is within the physician's
current realm of competence solely because the patient is seropositive." Council on
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based on the possibility of an accidental transmission of HIV
and on the number of infections that were actually acquired on
the job." Then, in 1990, the CDC received a report of a young
woman with AIDS who apparently was not infected through
any of the established channels for HIV infection (i.e., receipt
of a contaminated blood transfusion or any documented behav-
ioral risk factors, including intravenous drug use or sex with a
HIV-infected person). After it was determined that the wom-
an, Kimberly Bergalis, had had two teeth extracted by a den-
tist who was HIV-positive, the CDC compared blood samples
from Bergalis and the dentist to determine the relatedness of
the HIV DNA sequences of both persons.39 When the results
showed a similarity between the viral DNA sequences of
Bergalis and her dentist, the CDC concluded that the case was
"consistent with transmission of HIV to a patient during an
invasive dental procedure, although [the] possibility of another
source of infection cannot be entirely excluded.""
Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Ethical Issues Involved in the Growing AIDS Crisis,
259 JAMA 1360 (1988) (promoting guidelines for the treatment and care of AIDS
victims). Physicians, however, are not bound to act in the way the AMA mandates,
as evidenced by the continuing refusal of some physicians to treat HIV-infected
individuals, e.g., Miller v. Spicer, 822 F. Supp. 158 (D. Del. 1993) (surgeon refused
to perform required surgery because he suspected his patient had AIDS), and by
physicians arguing that they have a right to know the HIV status of their pa-
tients. See e.g., Ordway v. County of Suffolk, 154 Misc. 2d 269, 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014
(Sup. Ct. 1992) (surgeon's action against county for its failure to inform him that
patient/arrestee had HIV).
3 As of July 1993, the CDC has confirmed that thirty-seven HCWs were occu-
pationally infected with HIV. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REP., July 1993, at 13 (Table 11). Thirty-two of those
HCWs occupationally infected were infected by a needlestick injury or cut by a
scalpel or other sharp object. Michele Turk, High Anxiety, NEW PHYSICIAN, Sept.
1993, at 17, 17. HCWs suffer an estimated 800,000 needlestick injuries each year.
Id. Surgeons are thought to be at the greatest risk of occupationally acquired HIV
infection because they come into direct contact with a patient's blood in an esti-
mated one of every five invasive procedures. Id. In addition, between 25% to 80%
of medical students and residents are injured during the first year of clinical
training. Id. at 17-18. The actual number of occupationally infected workers is
probably much higher, but fears of losing jobs and insurance may inhibit the re-
porting of transmission incidents. Id. at 19.
" Centers for Disease Control, Possible Transmission of Human Immunodefi-
ciency Virus to a Patient During an Invasive Dental Procedure, 264 JAMA 1092
(1990).
2, Id. at 1093.
,0 Id. at 1092. The precise mechanism of transmission has still not been deter-
mined.
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The Bergalis case lent credence to the fears that HIV-in-
fected HCWs can transmit HIV to their patients.41 These
fears were heightened when five other persons were reported
to have been infected by the same dentist.42 In response to the
heightened concerns, in July 1991, the CDC released updated
guidelines regarding the prevention of HIV transmission in
health care settings.3 In addition to emphasizing the use of
universal precautions as the primary technique for preventing
HIV transmission,44 the guidelines suggest that HCWs who
"' Before the Bergalis case, HCWs feared being infected by their patients be-
cause the transmission of HIV from infected patients to their HCWs was docu-
mented. See supra, notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
2 Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Update: Investigations of Persons
Treated by HIV-Infected Health-Care Workers-United States, 41 MMWR 329
(1993). These six cases, however, remain the only documented cases of HIV trans-
mission from HCW to patient. According to the CDC, as of March 1993, reports of
investigations on 19,036 patients of 57 HIV-infected HCWs in the United States
have revealed no other cases of HIV transmission. 41 MMWR 329 (1993); see also
Gordon M. Dickinson et al., Absence of HIV Transmission From an Infected Dentist
to His Patients: An Epidemiological and DNA Sequence Analysis, 269 JAMA 1802
(1993) (study of 1,192 patients who had undergone 9,267 procedures performed by
HIV-infected dentist indicated that there was no documented case of HIV trans-
mission from dentist to patient); Ban Mishu et al., A Surgeon With AIDS: Lack of
Evidence of Transmission to Patients, 264 JAMA 467 (1990) (finding no cases of
HIV transmission in 616 patients of HIV-infected surgeon); Audrey S. Rogers et
al., Investigation of Potential HIV Transmission to the Patients of an HIV-Infected
Surgeon, 269 JAMA 1795 (1993) (finding no HIV transmission in 369 person-hours
of surgical exposure); C. Fordham von Reyn et al., Absence of HIV Transmission
From an Infected Orthopedic Surgeon: A 13-Year Look-Back Study, 269 JAMA 1807
(1993) (finding no cases of HIV infection among 1,174 former patients on whom
invasive procedures were performed during a 13.5-year period).
' Centers for Disease Control, Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of
Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis B Virus to Patients During Expo-
sure-Prone Invasive Procedures, 40 MMWR 1 (1991) [hereinafter Recommendations
for Preventing Transmission].
" In light of the Bergalis case and the ensuing public fears about the possibili-
ty that an HIV-infected HCW can transmit HIV to a patient, there were concerns
on the part of HCWs that the new CDC guidelines would require mandatory test-
ing of HCWs. Lawrence K. Altman, AIDS Testing of Doctors is Crux of Thorny
Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1990, at Al. Instead, they require disclosure of an
HIV-infected HCW's status to patients before performance of invasive procedures
or withdrawal from performing those procedures. Recommedations for Preventing
Transmission, supra note 43, at 4. Similarly, in 1991, perhaps in response to in-
creased fear concerning HIV-infected HCWs, the AMA and American Dental Asso-
ciation (ADA) both recommended that HIV-infected HCWs inform their patients or
give up performing invasive procedures. MUNSON, supra note 9, at 221.
Universal precautions emphasize the need to treat blood and other body fluids
from all patients as potentially infective. Recommedations for Preventing Transmis-
sion, supra note 43, at 1. The precautions include: the routine use of appropriate
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perform invasive procedures that can lead to contact with
blood "should know their own HIV antibody status," and if
HIV-positive, refrain from "exposure-prone" procedures.45 It is
also recommended that they seek the counsel of an expert
review panel for advice on what circumstances would permit
them to continue to perform, and what procedures they should
be allowed to carry out.46
barrier precautions to prevent skin and mucous-membrane exposure (e.g., gloves,
masks, protective eyewear or face shields, gowns, aprons, etc.); the requirement
that hands and other skin surfaces are washed immediately and thoroughly after
gloves are removed; proper use and disposal of needles, scalpels and other sharp
instruments; the use of proper disinfection and sterilization techniques for instru-
ments and other reusable equipment and; refraining from direct contact with pa-
tients where the HCW's skin is open (e.g., due to dermatitis or cuts), until the
skin is healed. Id. at 1-4.
An examination of hepatitis-B virus ("HBV") transmission in health care set-
tings emphasizes the importance of using universal precautions and proper barrier
techniques to reduce the risk of HIV transmission. Since the early 1970s, when
blood testing for HBV began, there have been reports of over 300 patients infected
with HBV by an HBV-infected HCW. Id. at 2. These cases of HBV transmission
have been attributed to either the HCW's failure to use proper barrier techniques
(e.g., not wearing gloves during an invasive procedure) or to an accident occurring
during an invasive procedure. Id at 3. The risk of HBV transmission to an HOW
after percutaneous exposure to HBV-infected blood is estimated at 30%. Id. By
contrast, the risk of HIV transmission to an HCW after percutaneous exposure to
HIV-infected blood is estimated to be 0.3%. Id. at 3. Because HBV is one hundred
times more infectious than HIV, the risk of HIV transmission from an HIV-infect-
ed HCW is proportionately lower as long as proper barrier techniques are used.
Id. Conversely, the risk that HIV-infected patients pose to their HCWs is much
higher. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
Prior to 1991, the CDC's guidelines for preventing HIV transmission in health
care settings emphasized the use of universal precautions and reflected only con-
cern over the risks that HIV-infected patients posed to their HCWs. Prevention of
HIV Transmission, supra note 28, at 4S. Many HOWs, however, were calling for
mandatory testing of patients and argued that the guidelines were too vague and
difficult to interpret. Altman, supra, at A17.
' Exposure-prone invasive procedures include situations where the "fingers and
a needle or other sharp instrument or object [are] in a poorly visualized or highly
confined anatomic site." Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note
44, at 3. The CDC defines invasive procedures as:
surgical entry into tissues, cavities, or organs or repair of major traumat-
ic injuries 1) in an operating or delivery room, emergency department, or
outpatient setting, including both physicians' and dentists' offices; 2) car-
diac catheterization and angiographic procedures; 3) a vaginal or cesarean
delivery or other invasive obstetric procedure during which bleeding may
occur, or 4) the manipulation, cutting, or removal of any oral or perioral
tissues, including tooth structure, during which bleeding occurs or the
potential for bleeding exists.
Prevention of HIV Transmission, supra note 28, at 6S-7S.
46 Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 43, at 4. The
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B. Cancerphobia and AIDSphobia Cases
1. General Principles of Emotional Distress Claims
When a defendant's negligence is the cause of a plaintiff's
emotional distress, and when there has been no physical im-
pact upon the plaintiff, courts analyze the defendant's liability
under traditional negligence principles of duty and proximate
cause. Under a duty analysis, the relevant inquiry is whether a
defendant has a duty to guard against the occurrence of emo-
tional distress.47 Under a proximate cause analysis, the ques-
tion is whether the emotional distress is sufficiently foresee-
able to be considered the proximate result of the defendant's
conduct.4"
Courts traditionally have been reluctant to allow recovery
for emotional distress without any accompanying physical
impact on the plaintiff.4" Most courts, however, now allow re-
covery for emotional distress without a showing of harm
caused by impact or trauma, so long as there are physical
symptoms of the emotional distress (e.g., nightmares, shock,
pain, sleeplessness, etc.).50 The rationale underlying this rule
is that objective physical symptoms provide a minimum guar-
panel of experts could include the infected HCW's personal physician(s) in conjunc-
tion with the medical directors and personnel health services staff of their employ-
ing institution or hospital. Id.
'" See, e.g., McCance v. Lindau, 492 A.2d 1352, 1358 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985)
("When a reasonable person knows or should have known that certain types of
conduct constitute an unreasonable risk of harm to another, he or she has the
duty to refrain from that conduct."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
435(2) (1965) (a duty is imposed if it appears highly likely that the conduct in
question should have brought about the harm).
'" See, e.g., Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1553, 1559 (N.D.
Ill. 1983) (noting that the traditional notion of proximate cause requires that the
emotional distress be reasonably foreseeable); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, supra note 47, at § 435 (stating that a defendant's negligent conduct is the
legal cause of the plaintiffs harm unless the harm is so "highly extraordinary"
that liability should not be imposed).
" See generally Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982) (reviewing
the evolution of emotional distress as a theory of recovery); Ordway v. County of
Suffolk, 154 Misc. 2d 269, 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (same).
" See Payton, 437 N.E.2d at 178; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
supra note 47, at § 436A ("If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unrea-
sonable risk of causing either bodily harm or emotional disturbance to another,
and it results in such emotional disturbance alone, without bodily harm or other
compensable damage, the actor is not liable for such emotional disturbance.").
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antee of the genuineness of the claim and reduce the risk of
fraudulent claims.5' Also, any "emotional disturbance which is
not so severe and serious as to have physical consequences is
normally in the realm of the trivial, and so falls within the
maxim that the law does not concern itself with trifles."5 2 Fi-
nally, in those cases where the defendant's conduct has been
merely negligent without any intention to cause harm, the
defendant's fault does not rise to the level of requiring the
imposition of liability for a purely mental disturbance."
2. Cancerphobia Cases
The question of whether a plaintiff can recover for negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress where there is only the
possibility of the plaintiff developing a disease in the future,
after being exposed to some disease-causing agent, has been
addressed in claims for fear of developing cancer. Many plain-
tiffs have brought cancerphobia claims after being exposed to
asbestos fibers. For example, in Jackson v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp.,' a shipyard worker was exposed to asbestos and
sought recovery for his emotional distress against the manufac-
turers of asbestos products used at his work-site. Because the
plaintiff was suffering from asbestosis, the court reasoned that
his emotional distress was recoverable.55 Similarly, the plain-
tiff in Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp.56 was exposed to asbes-
tos while on the job. The court allowed him to recover for his
emotional distress and fear of developing cancer because his
exposure to asbestos led to pleural thickening of his lungs."7
Plaintiffs have also brought cancerphobia claims after
exposure to toxic chemicals found in their water supply. In
Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co.,58 the plaintiffs drinking
water was contaminated with chlordane, a possible carcinogen,
after the defendant sprayed for termites in the area surround-
" Payton, 437 N.E.2d at 178.
52 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 47, at 436A cmt. b.
5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORT, supra note 47, at 436A cmt. b.
781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
5' Id. at 414-15.
5 785 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1986).
17 Id. at 88-89.
58 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982).
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ing the plaintiffs' underground water spring. The chemical
seeped into the water supply after heavy rains in the area. The
court found that plaintiffs could recover for their fear of devel-
oping cancer in the future because they ingested an unknown
amount of the toxic chemical.59 The court, however, limited
the plaintiffs' recovery for emotional distress to the period
between when they first learned that they ingested the chemi-
cal, to the time they were advised by a physician that they
need not get further testing for effects of the exposure.'o
Skin contact with toxic chemicals has also led to cancer-
phobia claims. For example, in Hagerty v. L & L Marine Ser-
vices," a seaman was loading a barge when he was complete-
ly soaked with dripolene, a carcinogenic chemical compound.
The court allowed the plaintiff to recover for his fear of devel-
oping cancer, stating that his fear was reasonable and causally
related to the defendant's negligence.62
3. AIDSphobia Cases6 3
Courts have been divided over the compensability of
AIDSphobia. Some courts have denied recovery when the
plaintiff cannot demonstrate infection with HIV in the form of
a positive test for HIV antibodies.' Other courts will find the
requirement that the plaintiff prove infection satisfied, howev-
er, if the plaintiff can establish a channel of blood-to-blood
exposure that would have allowed transmission of HIV.' For
"' Id. at 434.
60 Id.
61 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1986).
62 Id. at 319.
See supra notes 14-16.
See, e.g., Burk v. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (de-
nying recovery to paramedic stuck by a needle protruding from a waste disposal
container for needles and sharp objects because the paramedic was unable to show
the needle was used on an AIDS patient and because the paramedic tested nega-
tive for HIV); Hare v. State, 173 A.D.2d 523, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125 (2d Dep't 1991) (in
an AIDSphobia claim brought by a hospital technician who was bitten by a prison
inmate, recovery was denied because plaintiffs fear was based on rumors that the
inmate had AIDS and plaintiff tested negative for HIV infection).
' See, e.g., Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 810 F. Supp. 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(allowing an emotional distress claim by a railroad worker who was stuck by a
used hypodermic needle left in an area where drug addicts loitered), affd, No. 93-
7521, 1994 WL 401512 (2d Cir. July 29, 1994); Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
153 Misc. 2d 1, 588 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (allowing claim for fear of devel-
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example, in Ordway v. County of Suffolk,66 the New York Su-
preme Court denied the AIDSphobia claim of a surgeon who
performed two operations on an HIV-infected patient. For each
surgical procedure, the surgeon wore "a surgical scrub suit
consisting of pants, a shirt, sterile gown, sterile mask and
surgical gloves." 7 In denying the claim, the court reasoned
that the plaintiff had tested negative for HIV antibodies and
had not shown a channel of transmission that would have
allowed HIV to be passed from the patient, such as "[a] broken
glove, pierced skin, patient bite, etc."6"
Similarly, in Funeral Services by Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefield
Community Hospital,69 the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals rejected a claim by a mortician who embalmed a
corpse unaware that it was HIV-infected." Because the plain-
tiff had tested negative for HIV antibodies and had not offered
proof that he "punctur[ed] his gloves during the embalming
procedure" nor proof of other events with the potential for
exposure, the court reasoned that he was "merely
hypothesiz[ing] as to how a potential exposure to the virus
may have occurred."71
Where it is not known if the alleged HIV source was actu-
ally contaminated with HIV, some courts have held that the
showing of a channel of transmission is sufficient to allow
recovery for AIDSphobia. In Marchica v. -Long Island R.R.,72
while the plaintiff was clearing away litter that was left in a
work area, a hypodermic needle stuck his finger. The plaintiff
suffered fear of developing AIDS because the needle was left in
an area where "homeless people and drug addicts" loitered. 3
The court found that "the plaintiff.., sustained sufficient
physical injury to support an award" for his fear of developing
oping AIDS by a cleaning woman whose thumb was stuck by a used hypodermic
needle that was left in an office waste container).
" 154 Misc. 2d 269, 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
' Id. at 270, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 1015.
6" Id.
6' 413 S.E.2d 79 (W. Va. 1991), overruled by Courtney v. Courtney, 437 S.E.2d
889 (W. Va. 1993).
70 Id. at 84.
71 Id. at 82.
72 810 F. Supp. 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), affd, No. 93-7521, 1994 WL 401512 (2d
Cir. July 29, 1994).
73 Id. at 446.
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AIDS, even though there was no proof at the time that he had
contracted HIV.74
Similarly, in Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., the plain-
tiff was a cleaning worker whose thumb was stuck by a used
hypodermic needle that was left in an office waste container.76
The hypodermic needle was allegedly used to draw blood sam-
ples from the defendant's prospective life insurance applicants.
The court reasoned that because a needlestick provides a chan-
nel of transmission the plaintiff could recover for her fear of
developing AIDS.77
In contrast, some courts have denied recovery if the plain-
tiff does not show that the claimed source of infection is itself
infected with HIV, even if the plaintiff is able to show a chan-
nel of transmission. These courts reason that recovery for emo-
tional distress that arises out of a fear of contracting a disease
cannot be allowed if the plaintiff cannot prove exposure to the
agent that causes the feared disease.7" For example, in Burk
v. Sage Products, Inc.,79 the plaintiff was a paramedic who
was stuck by a needle protruding from a disposal container for
used needles and syringes." The plaintiff feared contracting
HIV as a result of the needle stick because he saw several
AIDS patients on the hospital floor where he was using the
disposal container. The court denied recovery because the
plaintiff was unable to show that the needle that pricked him
was used on an AIDS patient. Consequently, he failed to dem-
onstrate exposure to the virus. Since the damages that he was
claiming were based on his fear of contracting HIV and devel-
oping AIDS, the court reasoned that his action must fail be-
cause he will never get the disease that he feared developing."1
74 Id. at 453.
"' 153 Misc. 2d 1, 588 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
76 Id. at 2, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
77 Id. at 6, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 698.
78 Burk v. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1990); see also Hare v.
State, 173 A.D.2d 523, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125 (2d Dep't 1991) (denying recovery to
plaintiff who had fear of developing AIDS after he was bitten by a prison inmate
who was only rumored to have had AIDS); Doe v. Doe, 136 Misc. 2d 1015, 519
N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (denying recovery for AIDSphobia in wife's claim that
her husband had had homosexual affairs and put her at risk of developing AIDS).
' 747 F. Supp. at 285.
Id. at 286.
81 Id. at 288.
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4. The 'Window of Anxiety" Cases
In the wake of the well-publicized Bergalis case, two
courts recently decided AIDSphobia claims by plaintiffs whose
surgeons were HIV-infected. Faya v. Almaraz,82 involved two
companion cases brought by former patients of Dr. Rudolph
Almaraz, a surgical oncologist who specialized in breast cancer
and who performed invasive procedures on both patients.'
More than one year after their surgeries, the plaintiffs
learned of Dr. Almaraz's HIV infection and they immediately
had a blood test for HIV infection. The test results for both
were negative. Subsequently, both plaintiffs filed separate
actions against Dr. Almaraz seeking to recover damages for
their fear of developing AIDS based on, inter alia, negligent
failure to obtain the patient's informed consent and negligent
infliction of emotional distress.'
82 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993).
83 See supra note 45 for a definition of invasive procedures.
" This Note will address only the negligent infliction of emotional distress
claim as the basis of recovery for AIDSphobia and assumes that the informed
consent doctrine imposes a duty on HIV-infected HCWs to disclose that status to
their patients before performing invasive procedures. Under the doctrine of in-
formed consent, a physician has a duty to disclose medical information and "those
risks which a reasonably prudent patient would consider material or significant in
making the decision about what course of treatment, if any, to accept." Estate of
Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1278 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991)
(discussing the development of the informed consent doctrine). The medical infor-
mation or risks of a procedure are material when "a reasonable patient would be
likely to attach significance to it in deciding whether or not to submit to the
treatment." Id.; see also Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.) (adopting
the "reasonable patient" standard), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). But see
Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan. 1960) (adopting a "professional com-
munity" standard which dictates that physicians need only disclose that which a
"reasonable medical practitioner" would disclose in the same or similar circum-
stances).
The question of whether HIV-infected HCWs have a duty to disclose their
HIV-status to their patients has generated much commentary. According to a 1991
survey, 90% of Americans think all HIV-infected HCWs should be required to tell
patients if they are infected with HIV. Bill Gentile, Doctors and AIDS, NEWSWEEK,
July 1, 1991, at 48, 51. Consistent with this belief, if they knew that their HCW
was 11V-infected, 65% of those responding to the survey stated that they would
discontinue all treatment with their HCW. Id. at 52. Another 13% said they would
continue treatment but exclude surgery or other invasive procedures, and 15% said
they would continue treatment as long as stringent protective measures were used.
Id. The 1991 CDC guidelines, see supra note 43, require IV-infected HCWs to
either disclose their status to their patients before performing any invasive proce-
dure or refrain from performing those procedures. See supra notes 43-46 and ac-
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The Maryland Court of Appeals found that Dr. Almaraz
had a duty to either inform his patients that he was HIV-in-
fected or to refrain from performing the procedures." Ulti-
mately the court held that although the plaintiffs tested nega-
tive for the virus and were unable to show actual transmission
of HIV into their bodies during their surgical procedures, their
fear of developing AIDS was a legally compensable injury.86
The court, however, limited their recovery for emotional dis-
tress to a "reasonable window of anxiety" period: the time they
learned that their physician was HIV-infected to the point they
learned that they were not infected with HIV.8"
companying text. Because of the small possibility of FIV transmission from HIV-
infected HCWs to their patients, see supra note 37, and because of the fatal na-
ture of AIDS, some commentators have argued that HIV-infected HCWs have a
duty to disclose their status to their patients under the informed-consent doctrine.
See, e.g., Karen C. Lieberman & Arthur R. Derse, HIV-Positive Health Care Work-
ers and the Obligation to Disclose: Do Patients Have a Right to Know?, 13 J. LE-
GAL MED. 333, 356 (1992) (arguing that the "obligations of society" to protect HIV-
positive HCWs "from unjust discrimination and unnecessary infringements on pri-
vacy... cannot legally be transferred to unconsenting individual patients by
placing them at risk, even if remote, of death or serious harm without their
knowledge and consent"); Jeffery W. Cavender, Note, AIDS in the Health Care Set-
ting: The Congressional Response to the Kimberly Bergalis Case, 26 GA. L. REV.
539 (1992) (reviewing several congressional proposals designed to prevent Iv
transmission from infected HCWs to their patients and arguing that a duty to
disclose their HIV status is necessary, but recognizing that some protections must
be included to minimize intrusion on HCWs' privacy interests). But cf. Larry
Gostin, Hospitals, Health Care Professionals, and AIDS: The "Right to Know" the
Health Status of Professionals and Patients, 48 MD. L. REv. 12, 54 (1989) (sug-
gesting that universal precautions are a better alternative to reduce HIV transmis-
sion in health care settings, and that the risk of transmission is too low to war-
rant imposing a duty, which would only serve to "undermine trust in our health
care institutions without any public health utility"); Thomas E. Margolis, Commen-
tary, Health Care Workers and AIDS: HIV Transmission in the Health Care Envi-
ronment, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 357 (1992) (suggesting that adherence to universal
precautions and modification of medical instruments and techniques will reduce or
eliminate the need for practice restrictions or disclosure).
Some courts also have addressed the issue of whether HIV-infected HCWs
have a duty to inform their patients of that status under the informed consent
doctrine. See, e.g., Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 333 (Md. 1993) (stating that
because an HIV-infected HCW "might transmit the AIDS virus to his patients
during invasive [procedures,] . . . the seriousness of potential harm, as well as its
probability, contributes to a duty to prevent it"); Estate of Behringer, 592 A.2d at
1280 ("[T]he difficulties created by the public reaction to AIDS cannot deprive the
patient of making the ultimate decision where the ultimate risk is so significant.").
620 A.2d at 333.
8 Id. at 339.
7 Id. at 337.
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Following Faya, the California Court of Appeal in Kerins v.
Hartley also limited a plaintiffs recovery for her fear of devel-
oping AIDS to a "reasonable window of anxiety" period.' The
facts of Kerins were very similar to those of Faya. Plaintiff
Kerins filed a claim against her surgeon, Dr. Gordon, more
than seventeen months after her surgery, for her fear of devel-
oping AIDS after she learned that he was HIV-infected."9 In
allowing Kerins's AIDSphobia claim, the California Court of
Appeal held that her emotional distress became unreasonable
only when: (1) she received access to the report documenting
the operation procedures (because it would contain notations of
any accidents that might have occurred during the surgical
procedure) and/or some assurance that the surgeon did not cut
himself nor expose his blood in any way during the surgery; (2)
she received negative test results for HIV infection; and (3) she
received counseling regarding the accuracy and reliability of
the test methods and the improbability of being EIN-infected
when tests are negative eighteen months after the alleged
exposure.'
II. ANALYSIS
AIDS cortinues to be considered "a mysterious and stigma-
tizing disease" despite the efforts of educators and health orga-
nizations to educate the general public." The public hysteria
in response to the Bergalis case, and the resultant pressure on
the CDC that led to calls for restrictions on IV-infected
HCWs,92 are evidence of the strong emotions that HIV and
AIDS can cause. Strong emotions that are not tempered by
8 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621, 631 (Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Faya, 620 A.2d at 337).
89 Kerins was watching a newscast publicizing Dr. Gordon's legal battle with
his partners, who were refusing to allow him to return to his surgical practice.
During the television report Kerins heard Dr. Gordon's partners explain that they
were protecting their patients from exposure to HIV and AIDS. Id. at 623 n.1.
Id. at 632. The court of appeals reversed the trial court, which found that
Kerins's fear of developing AIDS was unreasonable because there was no proof
that she was exposed to Dr. Gordon's blood during surgery, nor proof that there
was a reasonable likelihood that she would develop AIDS. Id. at 627-28.
9L M.M.H. v. United States, 966 F.2d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Doe v.
American Red Cross Blood Servs., 125 F.R.D. 646, 652 (D.S.C. 1989) ("[AIDS is] a
disease that is widely thought of as the modem day equivalent of leprosy.").
" See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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objective information, however, should not form the basis of
public policy or dictate judicial decisions.
In AIDSphobia claims the actual injury at issue is the fear
of developing AIDS. There is a danger inherent in AIDSphobia
claims that the negative associations connected with HIV and
AIDS93 will blind both judge and jury from determining
whether the plaintiff was exposed to HIV. Because HIV causes
AIDS,' the plaintiffs exposure is the crucial question. Where
a plaintiff can prove actual exposure to HIV, in the form of a
positive test for HIV antibodies,95 there should be no hesitan-
cy in assigning liability to the defendant-as long as the plain-
tiff can prove that the defendant caused the exposure to HIV.
A difficulty in ADSphobia claims arises when the plaintiff can
only speculate as to whether there was exposure to HIV. This
speculation occurs when a person or object is either known or
suspected to be carrying HIV. Courts should not compensate
this speculation without requiring some form of objectivity by
which it can be determined that the plaintiff was exposed to
HIV.
A. Guidance from Cancerphobia cases
Because of the similarities between cancer and AIDS,96
courts faced with the question of whether to allow recovery for
AIDSphobia may find some guidance from cancerphobia cases,
which involve a fear of developing cancer and the emotional
distress resulting from exposure to a cancer-causing agent.
Such guidance can come in the form of how courts deciding
cancerphobia cases have resolved the issue of whether plain-
tiffs can recover damages for their fear of developing a future
disease. Courts have required that the plaintiffs meet two
requirements: (1) there must be a reasonable and genuine fear
that the plaintiff will develop cancer; and (2) there must be
some physical injury suffered from exposure to carcinogens. 7
See Gelman, supra note 1.
9' See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 85 (3d Cir. 1986)
(allowing cancerphobia claim because plaintiffs inhalation of asbestos fibers and
the resulting pleural thickening of his lungs could reasonably lead to a fear of
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Cancerphobia claims have been premised on a fear of de-
veloping cancer where there is no question that the plaintiffs
have been exposed to a cancer-causing agent. Consequently,
the question arising from cancerphobia cases is not whether
the plaintiffs were exposed to a cancer-causing agent in the
first place. Rather, the question is whether plaintiffs can recov-
er emotional distress damages arising from their fear that they
will develop cancer in the future, knowing that they were ex-
posed to a cancer-causing agent.
AIDSphobia claims, on the other hand, must first resolve
the question of whether the plaintiff was exposed to HIV in the
first place. Where there has been an exchange of bodily fluids
between a HIV-infected individual and a non-infected individu-
al, there is no question that the uninfected person has been
exposed to HIV.9" This exposure to HIV leads to a greater
likelihood that the non-infected individual may develop AIDS
in the future. Thus, where the plaintiff has actually been ex-
posed to HIV there is a close analogy to cancerphobia cases
because the exposure provides a rational basis for the belief
that AIDS will develop. With AIDSphobia claims, however,
there is usually only the potential that an exchange of bodily
fluids occurred through which HIV could have been transmit-
ted. Consequently, the analogy between cancerphobia and
AIDSphobia weakens because the recovery for emotional dis-
tress in cancer cases is dependent on the plaintiff actually
having been exposed to a cancer-causing agent, not on a poten-
tial exposure.99
developing cancer); Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 414 (5th
Cir. 1986) (same). See supra notes 47-62 and accompanying text.
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
For example, consider a plaintiff who was working in a building where dif-
ferent sections of the building were sealed off for an asbestos removal project. De-
spite the remote possibility that there was a leak in the barriers between the
asbestos removal area and the non-removal area, it is unlikely that many would
consider the plaintiffs claim of fear of developing cancer to be reasonable. See
Rittenhouse v. St. Regis Hotel, 149 Misc. 2d 452, 453, 565 N.Y.S.2d 365, 366 (Sup.
Ct. 1990) (rejecting the "asbestosphobia" claim of the plaintiff, who was temporari-
ly working in a building at the same time that there was an asbestos removal
project in progress in the building, because the plaintiff did not have any clinical
manifestations of asbestos-related disease).
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B. AIDSphobia Based on Speculation
Plaintiffs in AIDSphobia claims should be required to
prove exposure to HIV before being allowed to recover for their
fear of developing AIDS. The Burk rationale provides an appro-
priate standard which courts should follow when evaluating
AIDSphobia claims.0 0  Burk required that plaintiffs in
AIDSphobia cases prove both exposure to HIV and that there
is a substantial likelihood that they will develop AIDS in the
future.'0 ' This requirement of proving exposure can be met
by either (1) a positive blood test for HIV antibodies; or (2)
proof that the alleged source of HIV is itself infected or con-
taminated with HIV and that an explicit channel existed
through which HIV could have passed into the plaintiff's body.
It is common knowledge that HIV can be spread through
sexual contact, exchange of bodily fluids, sharing needles and
sometimes during birth or pregnancy."2 Also well known is
the fact that one cannot develop AIDS unless infected with
HIV. Despite this information, however, in most AIDSphobia
cases the plaintiffs do not even know if they actually came into
contact with HIV. The two-prong test does not deny that a
plaintiff feels fear. Where there is no rational basis to fear de-
veloping AIDS, however, that fear should not be compensated.
The two-prong test eliminates the problems inherent with
claims involving this undefined fear of developing AIDS.
A positive test for HIV antibodies, which indicates infec-
tion with HIV,' O3 automatically eliminates the question of
whether the plaintiff had been exposed to HIV.0 A negative
test, however, means it is more likely than not that the plain-
tiff was not exposed to HIV."05 Where the tests for antibodies
are negative more than one year from the time of the alleged
exposure, there is a certainty that there was no exposure to
1 Burk v. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1990); see supra notes
79-81 and accompanying text.
... 747 F. Supp. at 288.
' See supra note 28.
1 See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
10 The plaintiff must still prove that the defendant was the source of the HIV
exposure.
" See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
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HIV."0 6 Thus, requiring that a plaintiff prove exposure to
HIV in the form of a positive test for HIV antibodies ensures
that the AIDSphobia claim is reasonable and eliminates the
speculative nature of the claim.
The second prong of the test also provides guarantees of
the reasonableness of the claim by requiring proof that the al-
leged source of HIV is itself infected or contaminated with HIV
and that an explicit channel existed through which HIV could
have passed into the plaintiffs body. First, a requirement that
the alleged source be shown to be HIV-infected provides a
minimum guarantee that there was at least a possibility that
HIV could have been transmitted; if the alleged source is not
HIV-infected, the source cannot transmit HIV. Moreover, re-
quiring that there be a showing of an explicit channel through
which HIV could have been passed legitimates the concern
that HIV was transmitted. Since external contact with HIV-
contaminated bodily fluids is not sufficient to transmit
HIV, 1°' there must be a route through which contaminated
fluids can be exchanged. It is only by this exchange of body
fluids that HIV will be transmitted.' Thus, the requirement
that the plaintiff in an AIDSphobia claim show an explicit
channel through which HIV could have been transmitted en-
sures that there is a definite route by which the plaintiff could
have been infected. Without this explicit channel, the plaintiff
could not have been infected with HIV.
The requirements for an explicit channel through which
HIV transmission could take place, and proof that the source of
fear is itself HIV-infected or contaminated, will also reduce the
highly speculative nature of AIDSphobia claims. Under the
second prong, Marchica °9 and Castro"° were wrongly de-
cided. There was a failure to show that the needles causing the
plaintiffs' fear were contaminated with HIV. Consequently,
there was no showing that the plaintiffs' were ever exposed to
HIV. A better justification for allowing recovery in Marchica
1"6 See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
10. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
'o8 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
10' 810 F. Supp. 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying
text.
110 153 Misc. 2d 1, 588 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1991). See supra, notes 75-77
and accompanying text.
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would have been the negligent failure of the plaintiffs employ-
er to provide a safe and secure working environment. Similar-
ly, a pure negligence-based claim for the defendant's failure to
properly dispose of a used hypodermic needle would have justi-
fied recovery. By basing recovery in these cases on
AIDSphobia, however, the courts have left open the gates to a
flood of potentially frivolous litigation and perhaps contributed
to irrational hysteria about HIV and AIDS.
Ultimately, if emotional distress results from the possibili-
ty that AIDS will develop, AIDSphobia claims should not suc-
ceed unless the "possibility" manifests itself. Since AIDS can-
not develop if there has been no exposure to HIV, and the only
way that HIV can be spread is through the exchange of bodily
fluids, there must be a channel through which the exchange of
body fluids could have taken place.
C. "The Window of Anxiety" as a Limitation on
Recovery for Emotional Distress
A difficulty arises in health care settings where patients of
HIV-infected HCWs are rendered unconscious during an inva-
sive procedure. Unconscious patients cannot satisfy the second
prong of the proposed test because they were unconscious and
are unable to show whether there was a break in the barriers
that are designed to prevent HIV transmission. Consequently,
patients who were unconscious during an invasive procedure
would not be able to recover for their fear, despite the potential
that they were exposed to HIV during the procedure."'
The Fayal" and Kerins"' decisions offer a novel ap-
proach to resolving the question of whether plaintiffs who were
unconscious during an invasive surgical procedure should be
allowed to recover for AIDSphobia after they learn that their
surgeon was HIV-infected. The Faya and Kerins courts limited
the period of recovery for AIDSphobia to the period when the
patients learned that their HCW was HIV-infected to the time
the patients learned that they were not infected. This approach
... Assuming they test negative for HIV antibodies and do not manifest symp-
toms of HIV infection for several months.
1 See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
1.. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
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offers a method that is an attractive compromise between al-
lowing plaintiffs to recover for their emotional distress and the
competing interest in limiting the amount of frivolous litigation
to prevent overburdening the judicial system. The rationale
underlying the decisions is that, given its fatal nature, even a
remote risk that H1V could have been transmitted is sufficient
to allow recovery for fear of developing AIDS.
There are several weaknesses, however, to the "window of
anxiety" approach of limiting damages in AIDSphobia claims.
First, the approach only limits the time for which damages can
be recovered, without providing courts with guidance for deter-
mining how much recovery should be limited, if at all."' A
danger occurs if the trier of fact is left to determine how much
recovery the plaintiff should be allowed in an AIDSphobia
case. Given the fear and hysteria that surrounds the subject of
HIV and AIDS and their "negative" associations-death, homo-
sexuality and drug abuse"--it is likely that juries would al-
low an unreasonably large recovery for plaintiffs who allege
that their HCWs might have "given them AIDS."
Second, the plaintiffs in Faya and Kerins both learned of
their surgeon's HIV-infection more than one year after under-
going invasive procedures. Thus, their "window" was limited to
the two week period, during which they were waiting to get
their test results. This short time period might have served as
a deterrent to other similar claims because the short time
period may be perceived as resulting in a negligible compensa-
tion, and thus not worth the costs of litigating the claim."6
The applicability of the "window" limitation is less clear, how-
ever, when a patient learns of their HCW's HIV-infection less
than one year after undergoing an invasive procedure. If
seroconversion occurs within six to twelve weeks," 7 and a pa-
tient learns of their HCW's HIV-infection within two or three
weeks or months after an invasive procedure, and suffers fear
of developing AIDS as a result, it is not clear how long the
.. See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d
895 (1978) (suggesting that recovery should not be allowed where there is an
inability to measure damages in terms of dollars).
1" See Gehnan, supra note 1, at 79.
1 If plaintiffs are awarded a large sum of money, however, the deterrent factor
of a limited time period of recovery disappears.
"' See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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"window" would stay open. Exactly when a "reasonable medical
certainty" is established is not clear given the variability of
individuals in developing antibodies."' Certainly, the "win-
dow" should not remain open longer than one year after the
alleged exposure incident (allowing for the variability in devel-
oping antibodies).
Third, there is an inherent difficulty in establishing causa-
tion with the "window of anxiety" approach. If a patient does
receive a positive test result for HIV infection after undergoing
an invasive procedure performed by a HIV-infected HCW, it
would be difficult to determine if the invasive procedure was
the source of HIV-infection."' The patient is likely to claim
that the invasive procedure was the source. Of course, the
patient might have been infected through another source (ei-
ther knowingly or unknowingly), before or after the procedure.
There is a danger, however, that the trier of fact will automati-
cally give the utmost deference to the plaintiffs claim that the
defendant HIV-infected HCW was the source of the infection.
Because of negative associations, and because the plaintiffs
body was "exposed" to the environment, was under the defen-
dant-HCW's control, and because blood was exposed during the
procedure, the trier of fact might mistakenly conclude that the
defendant-HCW was liable despite a lack of evidence. Thus, in
the event of a positive HIV antibody test, it will be necessary
for a plaintiff to prove that there was no other source of HIV
infection, but difficult for a defendant-HCW to rebut the alle-
gation.
All of these weaknesses in the "window of anxiety" ap-
proach dictate that its application be limited to situations
similar to those of the plaintiffs in Faya and Kerins: where the
plaintiffs are unconscious during an invasive procedure per-
formed by a HIV-infected HCW. To otherwise allow recovery
... See supra notes 29 and accompanying text.
.' Genetic testing of viral DNA samples is a method that could be used to
compare samples from the infected HCW and the patient. These tests, however,
would serve as a further drain on the court's time and resources. In addition, the
tests are subject to different interpretations and questions of accuracy. See, e.g.,
United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1195 (8th Cir. 1993) ("concerns persist
over possible error and ambiguity"); CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVI-
DENCE § 205, at 900-01 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) ("The problems arise at
two levels: controlling the experimental conditions of the analysis, and interpreting
the results.").
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based on the "window of anxiety" approach in AIDSphobia
claims that do not meet these criteria will promote a large
number of speculative claims that would increase the hysteria
surrounding HIV and AIDS. Furthermore, allowing recovery
under the "window of anxiety" approach without requiring
these Faya and Kerins requirements would allow patients to
act on the basis of irrational fears and on the desire to avoid
anyone who is HIV-infected. It would also promote a large
number of claims that are based on rumor, innuendo, or the
perceived sexual preference or HIV-status of HCWs. Finally, to
allow these claims would perpetuate the mistaken belief that
the risk posed by HIV-infected HCWs is great enough to justify
their exclusion from practice of any kind.
CONCLUSION
As the AIDS epidemic continues to spread, courts must be
prepared to face an increasing amount of litigation that is
caused by people's fear of the disease. Given the continued
spread of HIV and AIDS, it seems inevitable that more
AIDSphobia claims will be brought in the foreseeable future,
especially in health care settings. By establishing a principle
by which recovery for AIDSphobia will be allowed, courts will
be able to minimize the number of frivolous lawsuits, and at
the same time provide predictability for those who are consid-
ering an AIDSphobia claim. A two-prong test that requires
proof of actual exposure to HIV provides such a principle. Re-
quiring either a positive blood test for HIV antibodies or a
showing that the source of fear was contaminated with HIV
and that there was an explicit channel of transmission will
ensure that only those plaintiffs whose claims are reasonable
and genuine will recover.
In addition, application of the "window of anxiety" ap-
proach to limiting damages will provide guidance to courts
deciding whether and how compensation for AIDSphobia
should be allowed. Its application, however, should be limited
in scope to situations where the plaintiff is a patient of an
HIV-infected HCW, the patient was unconscious during an
invasive procedure performed by the HCW and the patient
tests negative for HIV infection. Where the patient tests posi-
tive after undergoing an invasive procedure, the plaintiff
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should be required to prove that the invasive procedure was
the source of infection.
Ivan Yip
